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ON AN AUTHENTICATION SCHEME BASED ON THE
ROOT PROBLEM IN THE BRAID GROUP
BOAZ TSABAN
Abstract. Lal and Chaturvedi proposed two authentication sche-
mes presumably based on the difficulty of the Root Problem in the
braid group. We describe a deterministic linear time algorithm to
crack the first scheme, and show that the second scheme is not more
secure than schemes based on the Conjugacy Search Problem, and
can therefore be cracked by existing heuristic attacks with very
good success probability, as long as the parameters are practical.
1. The first authentication scheme
Lal and Chaturvedi propose in [6] two authentication schemes based
on the difficulty of the Root Problem in the braid group. The basic defi-
nitions are given in [6]. Their first scheme is defined as follows. We work
in the braid group Bn where n is even. In the sequel, multiplication
of elements of Bn means concatenation and reduction to left canonical
form. Let LBn = 〈σ1, . . . , σn/2−1〉 and UBn = 〈σn/2+1, . . . , σn〉.
Key Generation. Alice chooses integers r, s ≥ 2, a ∈ LBn, and b ∈
UBn. The public key is (X = a
rbs, r, s), and the secret key is (a, b).
Authentication. Bob chooses c ∈ UBn and d ∈ LBn, and sends Alice
the challenge Y = crds. Alice responds with (a hash image of) Z =
arY bs. Bob verifies that Z = crXds.
It is argued in [6] that the scheme is secure if the Root Problem of
finding x given xr (r ≥ 2 fixed) in Bn is difficult.
The first observation is that extraction of roots is not necessary in
order to crack this scheme.
Claim 1. If one can, given xy where x ∈ LBn, and y ∈ UBn, find
(x, y), then one can authenticate as Alice.
Proof. Take x = ar and y = bs. Then xy is known. Find (x, y) =
(ar, bs), and note that this suffices for the authentication. 
Supported by the Koshland Center for Basic Research.
1
2 BOAZ TSABAN
Claim 1 together with the following proposition implies that the
scheme is insecure.
Proposition 2. Given xy where x ∈ LBn, and y ∈ UBn, there is an
efficient algorithm to find (x, y).
Proof (sketch). The approach adopted here was suggested to us by
Shmuel Kaplan. We merely had to prove that it works.
Given a braid w ∈ Bn containing a strand starting at position i, there
is a well-defined braid ri(w) ∈ Bn−1 obtained by removing that strand
from the braid w (and enumerating the starting an ending positions in
the unique order-preserving manner). Note that ri(w) can be computed
in time polynomial in n and the number of Artin generators used to
write w.
Similarly, for a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we can define rI(w) ∈ Bn−k to be
the braid obtained by removing all strands starting at positions which
are members of I (and then re-enumerating the starting and ending
positions in an order-preserving manner).
Assume that x ∈ LBn and y ∈ UBn, and we are given a represen-
tative a of the homotopy class of xy. a is homotopically equivalent to
the braid b which is the side-by-side concatenation of (represetatives
of the homotopy classes of) x and y. Let I = {n/2 + 1, . . . , n}. Then
rI(a) is homotopically equivalent to rI(b) (the same homotopy works).
But rI(b) = x.
In summary, given xy, compute z = rI(xy). Then (in Bn) z = x,
and we can compute x−1(xy) = y. 
The attack works for any group G with LBn and UBn replaced by
any two commuting subgroups L,U of G with L ∩ U = {e}, provided
that for each x ∈ L and each y ∈ U , x and y can be efficiently recovered
from their product xy (note that the condition L∩U = {e} guarantees
that such a decomposition is unique). This is the case, for example,
with the subgroups As, Bs of Thompson’s group F , defined in Shpilrain-
Ushakov’s paper [9] (see the proof of Proposition 1 of [9]).
Gonza´lez-Vasco has pointed out to us that if L,U are as above, and
in addition either L or U is a normal subgroup of G, then for each
known w ∈ G, xwy can be efficiently (and uniquely) decomposed: If
L is a normal subgroup of G, then w−1xw ∈ L, and therefore we
can decompose w−1xwy into w−1xw and y (and then recover x from
w−1xw). The case that U is a normal subgroup ofG is treated similarly.
2. The second authentication scheme
Lal and Chaturvedi also propose a second scheme in [6], Scheme II :
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Key Generation. Alice chooses integers r, s ≥ 2, a ∈ LBn, and c ∈ Bn.
The public key is (X = arcas, c, r, s), and the secret key is a.
Authentication. Bob chooses b ∈ UBn, and sends Alice the challenge
Y = brcbs. Alice responds with (a hash value of) Z = arY as. Bob
verifies that Z = brXbs.
The attack of Section 1 does not apply to Scheme II. To crack this
scheme, it suffices to solve the following Decomposition Problem:
Given xcy where x, y ∈ LBn are unknown and c ∈ Bn
is known, find x˜, y˜ ∈ LBn such that x˜cy˜ = xcy.
In principle, the generic attack described in [3, 8] applies to this prob-
lem, and it seems that for practical parameters required to make the
system usable, its success probability will not be negligible. However,
the generic attack is much more time consuming than the one suggested
in Section 1, and to evaluate its feasibility, it must be tested against
practical parameters, which so far have not been suggested.
We therefore consider again the original Scheme II. Here too, the
powers are irrelevant for our discussion, so we consider instead the
following Generalized Scheme II : Fix a group G and subgroups A,B
of G such that A,B commute elementwise.
Key Generation. Alice chooses a1, a2 ∈ A, and c ∈ G. The public key
is (X = a1ca2, c).
Authentication. Bob chooses b1, b2 ∈ B, and sends Alice the challenge
Y = b1cb2. Alice responds with (a hash value of) Z = a1Y a2. Bob
verifies that Z = b1Xb2.
In order to crack Generalized Scheme II, it suffices to solve the fol-
lowing.
Problem 3. Given c, X = a1ca2, and Y = b1cb2 such that a1, a2 ∈ A
and b1, b2 ∈ B, find Z = a1Y a2 = b1Xb2.
More precisely, the elements a1, a2, b1, b2, c are chosen according to
known distributions on the relevant spaces (A, B, and G), and one has
to find Z with a significant probability. Similar probabilistic adapta-
tions can be made to all assertions in the sequel, but for clarity we
often omit those.
Lemma 4. Consider an instance of Problem 3. If either b1 or b2
is known to commute with c, then Z can be computed efficiently by
anyone.
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Proof. If b1c = cb1, then cb1b2 = b1cb2 = Y is known, and therefore so
is b1b2. It follows that
Z = a1Y a2 = a1b1cb2a2 = a1cb1b2a2 = a1ca2b1b2 = X(b1b2)
is known. The case where b2c = cb2 is similar. 
Remark 5. Note that in the original Scheme II, b1, b2 are both powers
of the same element b ∈ B, and if b commutes with c, then both b1 and
b2 commute with c. It could, however, be the case that b
r commutes
with c, but bs does not: In Bn, the fundamental element ∆ does not
commute with all elements, but its square ∆2 does.
As the roles of (a1, a2, Y ) and (b1, b2, X) in Problem 3 are symmetric,
Lemma 4 implies the following.
Lemma 6. Consider an instance of Problem 3. If either a1 or a2
is known to commute with c, then Z can be computed efficiently by
anyone. 
Assume now that Bob generates b1, b2 in a way that with a nontrivial
probability p, either b1 or b2 commute with c. Then, in about 2/p tries,
false identification is possible: In each try, the pretender flips a coin to
guess whether b1 or b2 commutes with c, and uses Lemma 4. This will
succeed with probability p/2.
But actually, one could heuristically check whether b1 or b2 commute
with c. By Lemma 6, if c commutes with all elements of A (or com-
mutes, with probability close to 1, with the elements of A generated
in the protocol, a fact that can be verified experimentally), then the
system is insecure. Thus, we may assume that it is easy to generate
elements a ∈ A which do not commute with c. Fix such an element a.
Compute
W = (b1cb2)a(b1cb2)
−1 = b1cb2ab
−1
2 c
−1b−11 =
= b1cab2b
−1
2 c
−1b−11 = b1cac
−1b−11 .
If b1c = cb1, then
W = cb1ac
−1b−11 = cab1c
−1b−11 = cac
−1b1b
−1
1 = cac
−1,
which can be verified as we know a and c. And if not, then it is unlikely
that W = cac−1, that is, that b1db
−1
1 = d, where d = cac
−1. The last
assertion just tells that cac−1 commutes with b1.
A similar argument applies for b2: Computing
U = (b1cb2)
−1a(b1cb2) = (b1cb2)
−1a(b1cb2) = b
−1
2 c
−1acb2,
we have that if b2c = cb2, then U = c
−1ac, and otherwise, this is
unlikely, as U = c−1ac if, and only if, b2 commutes with c
−1ac.
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We arrive at the following.
Lemma 7. In instances of Problem 3, if it is easy to find elements
a ∈ A such that with a high probability, cac−1 (respectively, c−1ac) does
not commute with b1 (respectively, b2), then it can be checked with high
certainty whether b1c = cb1 (respectively, b2c = cb2). 
In practical settings where c does not commute with all elements
of A, it is likely that any generic enough element of A will have the
properties required in Lemma 7. Moreover, since we can repeat the
test of commutation for many distinct a’s, the “high probability” in
Lemma 7 does not seem necessary.
By symmetry, if c commutes with any of a1, a2, then this can also
be detected heuristically, and by Lemmas 6 and 4, false identification
is possible in these cases, either.
We may therefore assume that none of the generated elements com-
mutes with c. In particular, there are many a ∈ A which do not
commute with c.
The following approach is inspired by the beautiful observations used
by Chowdhury in a different context [2]. For the elements a which do
not commute with c, we obtain as above the equation
W = b1db
−1
1
with d = cac−1 being a rather generic element of G. Similarly, we can
obtain conjugacy equations for b2, a1, and a2. This reduces the problem
to the (strict) Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem:
Given many equations W = xdx−1 where x ∈ B is un-
known and d ∈ G is known, find x (modulo the center
of G).
To see that this suffices, consider an instance of Problem 3, and assume
that h, g ∈ G are central (i.e., commute with all elements of G), and
that hb1, gb2 are known. Then
(hb1)c(gb2) · Y
−1 = (hg)(b1cb2) · Y
−1 = (hg)Y · Y −1 = hg
can be computed, and therefore so can
(hg)−1(hb1)X(gb2) = g
−1b1Xgb2 = g
−1gb1Xb2 = b1Xb2 = Z.
Moreover, it suffices to know either of b1 or b2 modulo the center of G
in order to find the other modulo the center of G. Indeed, if h is in the
center of G and b1h is known, then
c−1(b1h)
−1Y = c−1(b1h)
−1b1cb2 = c
−1h−1cb2 = c
−1ch−1b2 = h
−1b2
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can be computed, and is equal to b2 modulo the center of G. The case
that b2 is known modulo the center of G is treated similarly.
In principle, there could exist a solution to the given equations W =
xdx−1 which is not equal to x modulo the center of G, but this seems to
be unlikely in nontrivial scenarios. Indeed, if x˜ ∈ B is another solution
to all of these equations, then for each d used in the equations, xdx−1 =
x˜dx˜−1, and therefore x˜−1x commutes with d. Since the attacker can
generate as many such equations as desired and the elements d look
rather generic, it follows that x˜−1x is likely to belong to the center G,
and therefore x˜ is equal to x modulo the center of G.
This shows, heuristically, that Generalized Scheme II is not likely
to be more secure than schemes based on the simultaneous conjugacy
search problem.
We now move back to the original setting, where G = Bn is the
braid group. There are a variety of efficient heuristic algorithms for
the simultaneous conjugacy search problem in Bn, which have very
good success rates [5, 7]. Moreover, since we can choose many elements
a ∈ A, we can produce as many families of conjugacy equations for b1
(or for b2, a1 or a2) as we need and it suffices to solve correctly (modulo
the group’s center) one such family of equations, the probability of
success of the mentioned methods should get very close to 1.
This suggests that in practical settings, Scheme II is likely to be
insecure, either.
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